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Prologue 
This report is about the continuing federal relationship with 
Alaska Natives. In 1978, David Case and the Alaska Native 
Foundation documented the structure of the special relationship 
with an analysis of its historical and legal antecedents.1 Case 
concluded that the relationship endures despite the termination 
of most land-related trust obligations on the part of the Execu­
tive branch or Congress in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act (hereinafter ANCSA) .2 Land-related trusts, after all, are 
only one of a variety of federal obligations owed to Natives. 
Federal responsibilities can arise from a statute, treaty, 
Executive action or appropriations.3 Subsequent court decisions 
and congressional acts mandating the protection of Native sub­
sistence rights support Case's conclusion that the relationship 
remains intact in a broader context. 4 Moreover, the two most 
significant reaffirmations of the federal government's continuing 
responsibility to Alaska Natives, ANCSA and the Alaska National 
Interest Lands Conservation Act (hereinafter ANILCA), 5 point 
toward a new federal role in Alaska Native affairs founded upon 
the policy of self-determination without the threat of termina­
tion as set forth in Nixon's message to Congress of July 8, 1970 
( see below) . 6 
Beyond considering the present state of the statutory rela­
tionship, our analysis implicitly focuses on the Congress' and 
Executive branch's power to change this relationship. In the 
area of Indian affairs, the Congress has come to exercise plenary 
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power based on the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution.7 Absent congressional acts which mandate some 
level of federal responsibility to Natives, the Executive branch 
possesses an independent power over Native affairs which can be 
exercised to expand, reduce, or deny a special relationship as an 
enforceable federal obligation.B Native enforcement of federal 
obligations, in turn, has been limited by the scope of congres­
sional statutes, treaties, and Executive orders.9 This is not to 
say that the printed word of a federal statute or order has in 
itself formed the relationship. Case law construing such laws 
and mandates more and more relies upon the historical record of 
the course of dealing between Natives and the federal govern­
ment.10 In this report we propose the use of the historical 
record of federal relations in Alaska as a means to defend the 
relationship and to affect the federal government's broad discre­
tion in managing Native affairs. 
Even a cursory survey of federal actions in Alaska reveals 
that it has been a relationshp largely left to the Executive 
branch to fashion .11 Due to the near absolute ownership and 
control of Alaska lands from the time of purchase through the 
early days of statehood, the federal government has been able to 
manage Alaska much like a federal colony through the Executive 
branch and through intermediaries and agents. 
Where the Executive branch did not deliver services directly 
to residents or Natives, it often delegated such duties and 
obligations to others than Indian agency bureaucrats. The dele-
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gation did not deny or revoke the obligation of the federal 
government to provide a service7 the federal government did not 
lose jurisdiction by delegating the responsibility. This role of 
intermediary is so strikingly different from that played by 
intermediaries in other western regions that even state involve­
ment in service deli very should not be viewed as evidence of 
termination.12 
Far from terminating the relationship, policy initiated by 
the Executive branch has often led to a bolstering of the rela­
tionship by the Congress, as exemplified by the passage of the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (hereinafter IRA), as amended 
in 1936,13 which built upon the concept of Executive order 
reserves established in the early 1900's. It is this interrela-
tion between the Congress, the Executive branch, numerous inter­
mediaries and Native villages which must be understood first by 
analysis, and then worked to produce federal action supporting 
further development of a self-determination policy suited to 
Alaska. This means a policy that does not impair the pre­
existent relationships between the federal government and tribes 
or between tribes and their members. 
The federal government has always supervised and retained the 
ultimate responsibility for acts by the Executive branch and 
intermediaries in the area of Native affairs so long as the 
federal obligation remained intact and was not terminated. The 
federal government promised, in the passage of ANCSA, that no 
trust responsibility then owed to Alaska Natives was terminated 
by the Act.14 
Due largely to the confused perception of what the current 
relationship is, following the enactment of ANCSA, efforts should 
be made to institutionalize an oversight role traditionally taken 
by the federal government when it delegates trust-related serv­
ices in Alaska. An oversight role is consistent with the general 
policy of self-determination espoused by the Self-determination 
Act (hereinafter ISDA) of 197 l5 5 and by the subsistence provi­
sions of ANILCA as constructed in Alaska. 
When the federal government delegates service provision 
duties to intermediaries, such as the state or other Native orga­
nizations, we propose that the Congress or the Executive Branch 
must: (1) collaborate with affected Native tribes and 
organizations; ( 2) establish a standard of service to be deliv­
ered whether national, local or a combination; ( 3) verify the 
intermediaries' ability to deliver such service at the 
established standard; (4) provide a remedy whereby Natives who 
fail to receive the established level of service can obtain such 
service or some kind of relief from the federal government or 
through the courts; and (5) maintain a policing function, whether 
by actual presence or by reporting requirements. If the goal of 
self-determination is to be attained in Alaska without the threat 
of termination, some method of federal management of the 
remaining trust obligation must be enacted. Helter-skelter dele­
gations of federal responsibility without such a plan violates 
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the promised policy, may indeed be a basis for a breach of trust 
action, but most importantly may result in a de facto termination 
of the federal trust responsibility to Natives. 
In a time of austerity budgets, it may seem odd that Natives 
should try to enlist the aid of the Executive branch. The fact 
of the matter is that the cycle of congressional action on Alaska 
Native affairs has passed.16 Federal Indian policy in Alaska is 
now in an Executive branch mode as it has been so often in the 
past. The Executive branch and its administrative agencies are 
inventorying and cataloging the status of Alaska Natives and the 
federal relationship in Alaska, and will advise the Congress on 
proposed action in 1985.17 
Natives must now propose a plan of action for future trust 
activities. Any plan, necessarily, must include the State of 
Alaska, the most recent intermediary, who, together with Natives, 
could be adversely affected by any unplanned withdrawal of 
federal support in the provision of assistance or services for 
Alaska Na ti ves .18 In the long run, the relationship must be 
tailored to the "real economic and social needs of Natives, 
without litigation, (and) with maximum participation by Natives. 
" to borrow a phrase from federal land settlement policy in 
Alaska. In the short run, Natives must appeal to the conserv-
ative instincts of the current administration or find some safe 
haven in Congress with a plan which will build in a strong 
federal presence or oversight role. It must provide a system of 
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cooperation between the federal government, the Natives, and the 
State of Alaska--or at the very least protect the interests of 
Alaska Natives, as individuals and members of tribes under 
federal law and not as members of regional Native organizations 
only, organizations denied traditional tribal status by Congress. 
In analyzing the progressing federal relationship, we first 
look to the existing federal trust, focusing upon changes which 
have expanded and reduced its scope. Next, we consider ANCSA in 
its limited role as a land settlement, emphasizing its pres er-
vation of the special relationship. ANCSA has also been viewed 
as the harbinger of self-determination policy in Alaska. We test 
this claim and propose a future course for self-determination 
policy based, in part, on clues provided in recent congressional 
statutes. Fourth, we analyze the termination threat implied in 
the terms of ANCSA, in statutes applied to Alaska, and in current 
Executive appropriations, recommendations and administrative 
actions. This reflection on the effect and features of termina-
tion allows us to assess the current federal relationship in 
Alaska and attempt to steer self-determination policy away from 
its most disastrous results. Finally, we propose specific 
actions and policies which call for immediate attention in order 
to maintain a continued level of federal assistance and oversight 
consistent with the policy goals of self-determination and the 
realities of the present national conservatism. 
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I. The Current Trust Relationship
The underlying basis for the traditional trust responsibility
evolved from treaties entered into between the United States and 
Indian Nations .19 In the course of dealing between these two 
sovereign bodies, and in the practice of commercial trade, in 
land transactions, and in resulting abuses and hostilities it was 
incumbent upon the federal government to protect the interests of 
settlers and Indians alike by negotiating conciliatory 
agreements. Tribes ceded lands and ceased hostilities in 
exchange for the federal government's promise to provide money, 
goods, services, and assurances that remaining tribal land would 
be secure against further intrusion by settlers and their terri-
torial and state governments. Over time, Indian tribes came to 
rely on the federal government to protect their interests in the 
use and occupancy of their tribal lands and for the protection of 
their general welfare, much like a guardian ward relationship. 20 
Alaska Natives and the Executive branch never entered into 
such treaties: first, because the independent treaty power of 
the Executive was put to an end by Congress in 1871, 21 just six 
years after Alaska was purchased; second, because minimal settle­
ment or resource exploration pressure put little stress on Native 
land use and occupancy until the most recent times; and finally, 
because the maintenance of near exclusive federal jurisdiction 
and ownership of Alaska land allowed the Congress to manage 
Native affairs solely on the basis of federal statute and 
Executive action. In this sense, the relationship of Alaska 
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Natives to the federal government has evolved from a course of 
dealing similar to that shared by Indian tribes to the south. 
However, the special relationship with Alaska Natives is recog­
nized by statute, Executive orders and actions and case law 
without the benefit of treaties. David Case divided this legal 
history into four categories of protective federal acts, 
including: (1) Native lands and resources, (2) provision of 
human services, (3 ) protection of subsistence, and (4) promotion 
of Native government.22 
Though not a treaty between Indian tribes and the United 
States, the Treaty of Cession23 purported to make "uncivilized 
tribes" in Alaska "subject to such laws and regulations as the 
United States, may, from time to time adopt in regard to aborigi-
nal tribes of that country. 112 4 All other inhabitants of the 
territory were to be "admitted to the enjoyment of all rights, 
advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States." 
From the time of purchase, however, the United States has been 
hard pressed to identify Indian tribes or nations as it had iden­
tified them in its expansion across the continent. 
The only Alaska Native unit which resembled a tribe, and upon 
which the federal government soon began to base the special rela­
tionship, was the village. The federal government has found it 
necessary to identify Indians by means of their political asso­
ciation in order to determine who would be recognized as eligible 
to receive federal benefits primarily intended for the benefit of 
Indians, including Alaska Natives. The tribe has been the tradi-
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tional marker: 
By a 'tribe' we understand a body of Indians of the same 
or similar race, united in a community under one 
leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular
though sometimes ill-defined territory.25 
Early on, Felix Cohen recognized the difficulty in applying this 
definition directly to the situation of Alaska Natives: 
The natives reside in small, widely separated villages,
communities, or fishing camps, scattered along the 
25,000 miles of coast and on the great rivers, prin­
cipally along the southern and northwestern coast. For 
the most part they do not fall into well-defined tribal 
groups occuping a fixed geographical area. 26 
Regardless of this limitation, federal courts in Alaska have 
insisted on applying this test in distinguishing which Native 
bodies can take advantage of special benefits available to Indian 
27 tribes. Although such terms as "tribe" and "governing body" 
have been expanded by statute to include Native units other than 
traditional villages, the underlying purpose of identifying a 
group made up solely of Native individuals remains a common 
denominator of all such "tribes." 
Returning to the Cession Act, it is clear that from the 
beginning of the relationship between the United States and 
Alaska Natives that an individual Native could sever his or her 
relationship with the aboriginal way of life represented by the 
village or "tribe." Members of "uncivilized tribes" were subject 
to laws applied to Indians7 all others could become regular citi-
zens. 
Later territorial enactments further refined the point of 
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distinction from uncivilized versus civilized to simply "white" 
versus "Native." A bifurcated territorial school system enacted 
in 1905 28 conditioned Native attendance in "white schools" upon 
the adoption of "white man's way of life and association with 
white men and women. " The federal government's relationship and 
obligations to Natives was based largely on the rights they held 
as villagers, partaking in traditional lifestyles, and was stated 
clearly in an early federal court case construing the rights of 
Alaska Natives in the use and occupancy of lands in their 
possession: 
It is believed that the language of this act does not 
refer to lands held by Indians in severalty, but as to 
holdings by them collectively in their villages and such 
places as were occupied by themr that their methods of 
life were well understood to occupy lands in common 
either in villages where they lived, or for fishing,
hunting, and like purposes . • .  29 
Special privileges afforded Natives to subsistence were also 
allocated on the basis of their association with a particular 
community or village.JO 
Explicit recognition of the village community as the core of 
the federal government's relationship with Alaska Natives, 
however, did not come until the passage of the IRA. The IRA was 
intended to revitalize and in other cases start village govern­
ment, promote economic development in Native village communities, 
and allotment of reservation lands, and authorize the establish-
ment of new reservations. "Groups of Indians in Alaska, " under 
the statute was defined as: 
(those) not recognized prior to May 1, 1936, as bands or 
tribes, but having a common bond of occupation, or asso-
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ciation, or residence within a well-defined neigh-
borhood, community, or rural district. 31 
Until the passage of ANCSA in 1971, Alaska Natives qualified for 
benefits specially provided to "Indians" and "indian tribes" on 
the basis of blood quantum and by being members of "dependent 
Indian communities," primarily villages, whether IRA or 
traditionai. 3 2 
With the passage of ANCSA, "tribe" has taken on a newly 
expanded statutory definition which includes village and regional 
profit and non-profit corporations. These corporate "tribes" are 
incorporated under state law. In contrast to IRA and traditional 
villages, corporate "tribes" do not possess any residuary 
sovereign powers. Instead, village and regional corporations are 
limited to those powers conferred by ANCSA, by federal statutes 
recognizing the corporations as "tribes" for special purposes, 
and by state corporate statutes.3 3 
The Self-Determination Act is the primary federal statute 
recognizing Native corporations as "tribes" for purposes of serv­
ice contracting. 
Under the Self-Determination Act an "Indian tribe": 
means any Indian tribe . •  . or other organized group or 
community. including any Alaska Native village or 
regional or village corporation as defined in or estab­
lished pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act which is recognized as eligible for the special 
programs and services provided by the United States to 
Indians because of their status as Indians; 3 4 
Under the Act, "tribes" can authorize "tribal organizations" 
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to contract for BIA services on their behalf. "Tribal 
organization": 
Means the recognized governing body of any Indian triber 
any legally established organization of Indians which is 
controlled, sanctioned, or chartered by such governing
body or which is democratically elected by the adult 
members of the Indian community to be served by such 
organization and which includes the maximum partici�a­
tion of Indians in all phases of its activities . .  ,3 
Native corporations under ANCSA along with recognized Native com­
munities, including IRA and traditional villages, are considered 
"tribes" in this statutory sense. "Tribal organizations" include 
the governing councils of IRA and traditional villages recognized 
by the United States and non-profit corporations associated with 
regional corporations which come under the democratically elected 
clause of the definition. 
The extension of the term "tribe" to corporate bodies has 
increased service delivery options available to Alaska Natives 
pursuant to the Self-Determination Act and other federal statutes 
at the expense of further confusing the nature of the term 
"tribe" as it has been applied in Alaska. This episodic exten-
sion of tribal status by statute at the same time threatens the 
very vitality of the relationship by disregarding the original 
justification for the special trust relationship: that certain 
distinct Native communities had come to rely on the federal 
government to guard the health and welfare of the particular com­
munity, i.e., a general federal trust responsibility.36 
While Congress provided for dual recognition of traditional 
Native communities as well as Native corporations, it failed to 
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explain how the corporate tribes can hope to maintain their 
tribal status in the face of inherent limitations in their state 
corporate form. First, although corporate stockholder membership 
was originally determined on the basis of community connec­
tions,3 7 the prospect of free stock alienation may eventually 
destroy this community component of the corporate tribe. Second, 
the same free stock alienation may also produce corporate 
"tribes" wholly owned and controlled by non-Natives. ( Most of 
the aforementioned statutes provide a safeguard to such absurd 
results by conditioning recognition on BIA determination of eli­
gibility for Indian programs.) The danger of Native commitment 
to their corporate "tribes," without further assurances from 
Congress, is that at any time federal recognition of their tribal 
status could be terminated by amendment to the detriment of indi-
vidual Natives. Traditional "tribes," or other recognized com-
munities, may by then have been too long disregarded to be 
resuscitated. This shift by Congress and administrative policy 
makers in the focus of the relationship away from its federal 
Indian law analogues creates uncertainty in the federal 
government's relationship to Alaska Natives even beyond the 
earlier historical problem of identifying tribal units. It cries 
out for restructuring by Natives and by the Congress. 38 
Three Ways the Relationship Shrinks 
The shift to a relationship based on corporate "tribes" is 
only one of three general ways in which the special relationship 
is being changed and, arguably, contracted. The broad discre-
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tionary power of the Congress and the Executive over Alaska 
Native affairs is now being exercised to reduce the substance of 
the relationship ( 1) in terms of status, ( 2) by the scope of 
programs benefits offered, and (3) by appropriations. 
1. Status. Whether by design or by inadvertence, ANCSA enroll-
ment has become a peculiar status which serves to reduce the 
number of individual Natives who qualify for certain federal 
Indian programs. The most blatant example is the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (hereinafter ICWA)39 which defines "Indian" on the 
basis of membership in an ANCSA Regional Corporation: 
(3) "Indian" means any person who is a member of an 
Indian tribe, or who is an Alaska Native and a member of 
a Regional Corporation as defined in section 1606 of 
Title 43�"40 
Read alone, this provision would exclude unenrolled Alaska 
Natives, i.e., born after December 18, 1971, who do not acquire 
regional corporation stock through inheritance, purchase, or 
other legal means of stock transfer. It would also result in 
declaring as "Indian" any non-Native who might acquire regional 
corporation stock. Reading all the terms defined by the ICWA 
together would likely preclude such results, but does not in any 
way reduce a flood of ambiguities once more based in the concept 
of "Indian tribe" and "Indian organization." 
By establishing minimum standards for the removal of Indian 
children from their families and by conferring exclusive juris­
diction in child custody proceedings involving Indian children in 
Indian tribes, Congress hoped by way of the ICWA "to promote the 
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stability and security of Indian tribes and families," and, in 
part, promote the unique values of Indian culture. An "Indian 
tribe" under the ICWA: 
means any Indian tribe. . or other organized group or 
community of Indians recognized as eligible for the 
services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of 
their status as Indians, including any Alaska Native 
village as defined in section 1 602(c) of Title 43; 41 
An "Indian child": 
means any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and 
is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eli­
gible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the 
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe; 42 
One writer aptly describes the application of these defini-
tions to Alaska Natives as "inconsistent and circular," and warns 
that they "may lead to anomalous results. 11 4 3 In particular, the 
ICWA does not clarify whether the child must be a shareholder in 
an ANCSA corporation or a member of a Native village, IRA or tra-
ditional. It could be that either would suffice, except that the 
child must also be "the biological child of an Indian." Since 
"Indian" is defined in terms of regional corporation shareholder 
status, the aforementioned limitations arising from the system of 
ANCSA stock distribution and the prospect of stock alienation 
could result in the child being excluded from the scope of the 
Act. 
Unfortunately, the ICWA is only one of many examples of dif-
ferent statutory definitions of "Indian" and "Indian tribe" 
applied to Alaska. 44 More extensive contracting or administra-
tive options which this situation often offers Alaska Native 
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organizations does not make up for the uncertainty that will 
arise when the federal government determines the status of Alaska 
Natives in 1985.45 An apparently ill-informed Congress may not 
be sympathetic to a contingent of Alaska Natives who approach 
them with sincere welfare or economic development funding program 
problems in the midst of confusion over what in fact is the 
"tribal unit" and who in fact are the "Indians." Without added 
clarity in such definitions, Alaska Natives face the threat of 
uncertain service continuation (including possible termination); 
the federal government, under current statutory definitions, 
could conceivably judge their financial and social condition on 
the basis of their identity as corporations, communities or indi-
viduals. Precise and consistent statutory definition of "Indian 
tribe" is equally important to regional profit corporations who 
wish to maintain a distinction between business and social 
welfare endeavors. 
2. Scope of Programs: reduction by delegation. Largely because 
of the financial burden on the federal government and the coin­
cidental increase in state oil revenues, the current Administra-
tion wishes to transfer federal trust duties to the state. Such 
recommendations have been made for the transfer of BIA school 
4programs and general assistance. 6 Without an oversight program 
similar to the one outlined above, there is no guarantee that the 
state or Native organization intermediary will provide comparable 
47 service, if any at all. 
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The state or Native intermediary could well provide better 
service, in which case the federal oversight burden would be 
diminimus. Still, in view of our need to establish the con­
tinuing vitality of the special relationship, oversight is the 
minimum demonstration of the trust responsibility which the 
federal government should afford. It at least should remain an 
ongoing obligation due "Indian tribes" in Alaska. 
3. Appropriations. Proposed cutbacks in BIA general assistance 
with the expectation that state assistance will replace Native 
welfare needs overlooks the point that federal and state 
assistance do not share similar eligibility requirements or pro­
gram coverage.48 Thus comparable service will not be provided. 
The federal government's assumption of full state cooperation 
disregards an underlying reason for the federal trust: state 
governments, including Alaska, often have little sympathy for the 
unique problems of Native Americans. The implementation of an 
oversight program which could facilitate a reasonable transition, 
again, is the minimum which should be demanded of the federal 
government to comply with its assumed trust responsibility under 
federal statute and practice. 
Instead of reducing programs absolutely or shifting such 
duties to reticent intermediaries, the Congress, under Executive 
branch pressure, may simply reduce the appropriations required to 
run trust programs. Administrative agencies or intermediaries 
may then be unable to fulfill their statutory obligations to 
Natives. Normally, Natives would then be able to sue on the stat-
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ute Any remedy in the form of a mandamus may, however, be inef­
fective. Although the judiciary may force an administrative body 
to exercise its discretion to fulfill such a statutory duty,49 it 
is much less clear that it can order the Congress to fund Indian 
programs which the judiciary has concluded are within the exclu­
sive and plenary control of Congress. 50 To do so would be to 
challenge the Constitutional principles of the balance of powers 
between the branches of federal government. 
Finally, funds intended for Indian programs may also be 
reduced by issuing them in block grants to the state in the event 
that the federal government does delegate certain of its duties 
to the state government. The same Constitutional limitations 
strap the courts in this case, as above. 
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Specific Changes in the Special Relationship since Case 
We now look to the most significant changes in the special 
relationship since the Case analysis. For sake of consistency, 
we divide our analysis into the four general statutory categories 
proposed by Case: (1) Protection of Native Lands and Resources, 
(2) Provision of Human Services, ( 3) Protection of Subsistence,
and (4) Promotion of Native Governance.51 Our coverage of the 
specific changes is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, our 
approach reflects the underlying purpose of this report which is 
to point out major policy trends in the area of federal Indian 
affairs in Alaska as they affect the trust relationship and 
recommend courses of study and action required for its defense. 
l. Protection of Land and Resources. After ANCSA, federal
land trust obligations only extend to a limited number of Native 
allotments and to the Metlakatla Indian Reservation.52 
Section 905 of ANILCA expedites approval of Alaska Native allot­
ments pending before December 18, 1971 which had been filed on 
land that was in the National Petroleum Reserve - Alaska or on 
land unreserved as of December 13, 1968, when Secretary Udall 
imposed the formal land freeze via Public Land Order 4582. 
Subject to confLicting claims, qualified Native allotment appli­
cations were to be approved 180 days following enactment of 
3ANILCA.5  At the date of this report, the Bureau of Land 
Management has approved 3639 cases representing 6083 parcels and 
is still in the process of adjudicating 7370 cases which came 
under the exceptions of Section 905.5
4
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Once adjudicated, the scope of the federal trust obligation 
due allottees will be much less than had been the common 
understanding following the decision in United States v. 
Mitchell.55 In a suit to recover damages from the federal 
government for alleged mismanagement of timber resources on a 
wholly allotted reservation, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the General Allotment Act created only a limited trust rela­
tionship. Although the Allotment Act did impose a fiduciary duty 
on the government to prevent the alienation of those lands from 
the allottee, it did not authorize, much less require, the 
government to manage timber resources for the benefit of Indian 
allottees. The decision applies to Native allotments under the 
1906 Act56 since the management responsibilities under both Acts 
are identical. 
Beyond the automatic approvals provided by ANILCA, two recent 
cases57 insure that Native allottees are given the right to 
notice and hearing and the opportunity to give evidence to sup­
port their applications. 
Most recent incidents involving Native lands and resources 
have arisen from claims under ANCSA. In Cape Fox Corporation� 
United States, 58 Judge Fitzgerald held that ANCSA "does not 
create a trust relationship between the United States and village 
corporations as to withdrawn or selected lands or vest any rights 
of possession to such lands in the village corporation such that 
an action would lie for a pre-conveyance trespass or for 
damages." The case arose out of the federal government's exten-
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sion of a timber sale contractr the Forest Service had consulted 
with the village corporation prior to the extension. The case 
also holds that the duty of the Secretary to "convey immediately" 
lands due under ANCSA does not mean instantaneous conveyance, but 
rather "within a reasonable time under the circumstances and, 
further, that interests in the land do not vest until conveyance. 
The Ninth Circuit, on appeal, affirmed the transfer of a damage 
claim to the court of claims and dismissed an injunction as moot 
since the disputed land was conveyed to Cape Fox village corpora­
tion, but reversed Fitzgerald in so far as he held that ANCSA did 
not create federal trust responsibilities.59 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Alegnagik Natives, Ltd. 
v. Andrus60 held for the balance of hardships and the prospects 
that plaintiffs would show likelihood of success on their claim 
that ANCSA withdrew unsurveyed and unoccupied land in their town-
sites under the Alaska Native Townsite Act. In arriving at its 
decision, the Ninth Circuit found that "until third parties have 
acquired title, or at least taken steps to acquire title, from 
the trustee, the title remains in the United States," and there-
fore, remain "public lands" subject to withdrawal. Since the 
trustee is a federal agent, unoccupied trust lands which he holds 
by definition are not "valid existing rights" held by a third 
person which would otherwise preclude their selection by a 
village corporation. The case was remanded and injunctive relief 
ordered to prevent the trustee from allowing further occpation of 
townsite lots. 
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Finally, the Alaska Supreme Court held only recently that 
water appropriations acquired pursuant to 43 u.s.c. § 661 are 
valid prior conveyances of water areas in Alaska which were 
intended to extinguish any aboriginal title in such waters, as 
provided by Section 4(a) of ANCSA. In arriving at this decision, 
the court rejected the village corporation's contention in 
Pang-Vik, Inc., Ltd., v. Ward's Cove Packing Co., Inc., and State 
of Alaska61 that Section 8 of the Organic Act of 188462 exempted 
aboriginal lands from application of the public land laws under 
which the cannery's predecessor in interest acquired the water 
rights in question. The holding in Pang-Vik likely precludes any 
future Native claim to federal reserve water rights based on the 
Organic Act of 1884. 
2. Provision of Human Services. Two immediate concerns are 
the defunding of general assistance programs and the transfer of 
BIA school responsibilities to the state Regional Education 
Attendance AReas (REAA). 
General Assistance funding runs out and the programs will be 
shut down on November 20, 1981 unless Congress signs a con­
tinuation resolution before that date.63 State assistance 
programs will be unable to service most Native clients who lose 
general assistance because of the more restrictive state eligi­
bility criteria and procedures. 
General Assistance administrators enjoy broad discretion in 
providing for the needs of entire Native families not allowed 
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under the state system.64 Benefits have been made available to 
Native family units despite the presence of a residing male 
parent and available seasonal employment. 
Even if recent state regulations were liberalized to include 
more Native recipients, current levels of state funding 
( approximately $900,000 annually) in no way match the level of 
proposed cuts in general assistance ($5.7 million). No special 
provisions have been made for any transition to state assistance. 
BIA administrative personnel, however, are making attempts to 
inform their clientele about the state system, faced with the 
prospect of a total of 50 more operating days until their program 
is defunded.65 
School Transfer. The situation with BIA schools is not quite 
so dire as general assistance since current funding extends to 
September 30, 1982. The area administrator, however, has been 
directed to make the transition as soon as possible.66 The area 
office will be sending three teams to visit and consult with 
affected villages throughout the state and gather their views 
regarding the transfer. This review will likely be completed by 
the end of October at which time negotiations will begin with the 
REAA' s and the state for the purpose of forming a transition 
plan. The federal goal is to insure that the 38 BIA schools 
maintain "comparable or better programs" under state jurisdic-
tion.67 Whether a federal monitoring role is contemplated was 
left unanswered. 
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The state has expressed its willingness to incorporate BIA 
schools into the present REAA system, but is less certain about 
extra funds needed for bringing federal physical plants up to 
state standards. In the past, the state has accepted federal 
facilities, 11 as is. 11 The only extra funds now requested by the 
BIA are for severance pay and other costs of terminating federal 
employment along with limited funds for interim building main­
tenance. The prospects for the state obtaining extraordinary 
student expenses are bleak in light of proposed 35% cuts in 
Johnson/O"Malley Act funds. 
3. Protection of Subsistence. Two cases and two 
Congressional Acts have construed the federal government's obli­
gation to protect the subsistence culture of Natives since Case. 
First, in People of Togiak v. United States68 the United 
States District Court, District of Columbia, denied a motion to 
dismiss a complaint requesting the invalidation of federal regu­
lations regulatory jurisdiction over the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act (hereinafter MMPA) 6 9 to the State of Alaska as in derogation 
of the United States trust responsibility which required the 
Secretary of Interior to protect Alaska Native's rights to sub­
sistence hunting. The court found that the special Native exemp­
tion in the Act and the comprehensive nature of the federal regu­
latory scheme in this field worked to preempt state jurisdiction 
which effectively denied Natives their right to subsistence hunt 
under the Act. The effect of the holding in People of Togiak is 
left uncertain where the state is authorized to protect the sub-
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sistence hunting rights of "rural residents" under new amendments 
to the MMPA. People of Togiak states that the federal government 
has a special obligation to protect Native subsistence hunting 
rights without regard to other "rural residents.1170 
Second, North Slope Borough v. Andrus71 was an action 
requesting injunctive relief from alleged violations of federal 
trust responsibilities and several environmental and wildlife 
protection statutes resulting from Bureau of Land Management oil 
lease sales in the Beaufort Sea. Citing People of Togiak for the 
proposition that special provisions for Native subsistence in 
federal wildlife statutes impose on the federal government a 
trust responsibility to protect the Alaskan Natives' rights of 
subsistence hunting, the court stated three purposes for the 
trust responsibility (in the case at bar): 
(I)t precludes the use of the environmental statutes to 
undermine the subsistence cultures, (2) it requires the 
Secretary to be cognizant of the needs of the Inupiat
culture, and (3) it demands of the Federal government
(and thus the courts) rigorous application of the 
environmental statutes to protect the species necessary
for the Inupiats' subsistence.72 
Andrus resulted in an in junction against the Secretary of 
Interior, preventing the acceptance of any lease sale offers 
until the Beaufort Sea lease sale environmental impact statement 
was adequately supplemented. All intermediate agency action on 
the lease sales was found to be prohibited under the Endangered 
Species Act73 until a §  7(b) biological opinion confirmed that 
contemplated lease sale actions would not violate that Act. 
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Following Andrus, in respect to Native subsistence rights, the 
federal government's trust responsibility to Natives requires 
that the government rigorously enforce environmental statutes for 
the purpose of protecting species necessary for Native sub-
sistence. That is to say, a violation of the environmental stat-
ute here was also found to be a violation of the federal govern­
ment's trust responsibility. 
The dilemma faced by the federal government will be to recon­
cile the order to protect the endangered species and marine mam­
mals against depletion while at the same time protecting tradi­
tional Native lifestyles which rely on subsistence hunting of 
these same species. Currently a balance has been struck between 
these two interests in limitations imposed on Native takings. 
Takings must be done in a non-wasteful manner, and are restricted 
to the taking of non-depleted species. Species can only be 
hunted for subsistence and Native handicraft purposes. 
On Friday, October 9, 1981 the President signed off on 
amendments74 to the MMPA which would allow the Secretary of 
Interior to transfer management responsibilities to the State of 
Alaska. These amendments allow such a transfer if the state: 
adopts and implements a statute and regulation that 
ensures that the taking of the species for subsistence 
uses: 
( 1 ) is accomplished in a non-wasteful manner; and 
( 2 ) will be the priority consumptive use of the 
species; and 
(3) if required to be restricted such restrictions 
will be based upon:
(i) the customary and direct dependence on the 
species as the mainstay of livelihood; 
(ii) local residency;
(iii) availability of alternative resources.75 
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"Subsistence uses" is defined as: 
the customary and traditional uses by rural Alaska resi­
dents of marine mammals for direct personal or family
consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, tools or 
tansportationr for making and selling of handi-craft 
articles out of non-edible by-products of marine mammals 
taken for personal or family consumption and for barter 
or for sharing for personal or family consumption.7 6 
The state insisted on this language to avoid problems of 
equal protection challenges based on racial discrimination (i.e., 
protection of Native subsistence rights as opposed to rural 
residents). 
It is unclear whether the federal government still has a duty 
to protect Native subsistence hunting rights as construed by 
People of Togiak. The new amendments only replace the old Native 
subsistence provisions while the state law is in effect. How the 
duty of the federal government to protect exclusive Native sub­
sistence rights will be reconciled with the state's duty to pro­
tect "rural resident" subsistence rights is left unclear. 
Authorization for state assumption of subsistence use manage­
ment has also occurred on the public lands in Alaska under the 
subsistence title of ANILCA. 77 State assumption of jurisdiction 
over rural subsistence uses on public lands is conditioned upon 
"state (enactment and implementation of) laws of general applica­
bility which are consistent with, and which provide for the defi­
nition, preference and participation specified in sections 803, 
804, and 805 (within one year of the enactment of ANILCA)." The 
Secretary of Interior is ordered to monitor and advise the state 
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on its efforts to protect the subsistence use preference of 
Section 8 04 and make reports to Congress annually. If the state 
does not fulfill the conditions of Section 8 05(d), the Secretary 
must implement a federal plan which fulfills these conditions. 
Essentially, the federal government reserves the right to 
make three elements of the state subsistence law absolutely man-
datory. These are: ( 1 ) The definition of subsistence uses; 
(2) A preference for subsistence uses; and ( 3) A guaranteed 
quasi-rulemaking role for regional councils. Section 8 01(4) of 
the Congress' findings states the authority for such preemptory 
reservations: 
[ I ]n order to fulfill the policies and purposes of the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and as a matter of 
equity, it is necessary for the Congress to invoke its 
constitutional authority over Native affairs and its 
constitutional authority under the property clause and 
the commerce clause to protect and provide the oppor­
tunity for continued subsistence uses on the public
lands by Native and non-Native rural residents; 78 
As such, the subsistence provisions of ANILCA affirm an ongoing 
trust relationship between Alaska Natives and the federal govern­
ment and provide specifically defined subsistence rights and 
means to enforce them. Moreover, mandatory federal monitoring 
provisions ensure a continued fiduciary role which makes it 
incumbent upon the federal government to guarantee the con-
tinuation of subsistence economies in rural Alaska. 79 
Importantly, this occurs even as managerial authority is vested 
in the state. 
The current subsistence law for the State of Alaska does not 
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provide for regional councils--a mandatory requirement for state 
assumption of subsistence regulation. Although the terms of the 
state law need only be consistent with the subsistence plan of 
ANILCA, the Secretary of Interior will be required to implement a 
federal plan under Section 805(a) unless the mandatory provision 
of regional councils is accomplished by the state. Regional 
councils possess rulemaking authority and were intended to main-
tain a "meaningful role in management of. . subsistence uses" 
in local rural residents. 
Current conflicts between subsistence proponents and urban 
oriented sportsmen associations make resolution of the state sub- 
sistence law inconsistencies difficult, at best. Suffice it to 
say that future problems with the subsistence title seem una- 
voidable. Major issues concern the scope of the preference 
rights, the scope of Secretarial or State power to protect rural 
subsistence rights, and ( in regard to this report) what is the 
scope of the Secretarial moni taring functions. Does the trust 
responsibility impose strict standards on the Secretary in 
respect to his moni taring of state responsibilities under the 
Act? We believe so. Like any other environmental statute pro­
tecting subsistence uses, the trust responsibility demands 
rigorous federal government application of ANILCA requirements or 
risks requests for judicial enforcement of the duty.BO 
4. Promotion of Native Government. Native government can 
mean exclusive traditional or statutory Native governments main­
tained under federal law and founded upon concepts of sovereignty 
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or state municipal governments which are overwhelmingly 
controlled by a Native populace. 
ANCSA did not specifically alter any pre-existing governmen­
tal functions assumed by traditional Native village councils or 
Section 16 IRA's. ANCSA did revoke existing reservations (except 
Metlakatla) thereby putting in question whether tribal govern­
ments retain any territorial jurisdiction. Bl But some village 
corporations and Native villages have established land bases in 
their Native governments over which tribal jurisdiction can be 
exercised at least concurrently with the state.82 In one case, 
the federal government required such a land transfer to an IRA 
enveloped by village corporation lands.83 Regardless, federal 
administrative action demonstrates that Alaska Natives may still 
incorporate under the IRA even after ANCSA.84 
The fact remains that ANCSA implicitly encourages the forma­
tion of state municipal governments in Native villages.BS Until 
their formation in unincorporated villages, Section 14(c)(3) 
community lands will be transferred to the state and managed pur­
suant to a Municipal Lands Trust Program.86 The Municipal Lands 
trustee will be responsible for negotiating village corporation 
transfers and for managing lands held by him in trust for future 
municipal corporations.87 
Native villages which do decide to incorporate will be faced 
with unique developmental dilemmas. In most cases, the primary 
revenue base for a local municipal government will be the local 
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village corporation. Decisions to develop or not to develop 
village corporation land will likely turn on the tax burden 
imposed on the improvement by the villagers' own municipal 
government. Business analysts have commented that this situation 
could lead to either stunted or unnecessary village corporation 
88 resource development. As a consequence, the municipal corpora­
tion would be dependent upon state subsidies for service delivery 
and capital improvements. 
Natives have faced severe state resistance in efforts to form 
borough governments where the revenue base and the potential for 
Native control were immense.89 In the case of the North Slope 
Borough, the state legislature proposed to spread the resource 
base available to North Slope over the entire unorganized 
borough. Coincidentally, the predominantly non-Native controlled 
boroughs in Anchorage and on the Kenai peninsula were exempted 
from legislation denying any new borough, like North Slope, the 
power to tax oil and gas properties. Al though the tale of the 
North Slope Borough has been one marked with success, 90 it also 
leaves cause for concern on the part of Natives as to the 
willingness of the state to cooperate with Natives in their 
efforts to obtain effective local government control through the 
state municipal system. 
The status of tribal governments in the state, and federal 
support for such governments, is uncertain following ANCSA. The 
continued vitality of these governments depends on their utility 
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in modern day society. Traditional village councils and IRA 
governments recognized by federal law can acquire attributes of 
self-government, such as tribal courts, 91 but their function as 
local governing bodies relies upon both local village support to 
affirm their legitimacy and regional organizational support to 
confirm their authority. It is this concept of local control and 
allegiance which forms the basis of the federal concept of the 
"tribe."92 Without tribal status, the trust responsibility 
becomes vulnerable to the whims of congressional statutory 
reconstruction, eventually leading to de-tribalization. Such a 
course of events is likely to occur where the traditional unit is 
abandoned or falls to neglect on account of manpower and 
leadership shifts to ANCSA corporations, regional or village, 
profit or non-profit, or even shifts to uni ts of state govern­
ment. 
ANCSA 
Although ANCSA severely alters the land-related federal trust 
role in Alaska, it purports to be a neutral Act with respect to 
any other pre-existing trust responsibilities, including service-
oriented trust obligations. The policy section of the Act pro-
vides that: 
No provision of this chapter shall replace or diminish 
any right, privilege, or obligation of Natives as citi­
zens of the United States or of Alaska, or relieve, 
replace, or diminish any obligation of the United States 
or of the State of Alaska to protect and promote the 
rights or welfare of Natives as citizens of the United 
States or Alaska.93 
Later amendments to ANCSA made it clear that settlement benefits 
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would not "be deemed to substitute for any governmental programs 
otherwise available to the Native people of Alaska as citizens of 
the United States and the State of Alaska."94 Both provisions 
protect rights, privileges, access to governmental programs, and 
certain governmental protections otherwise due Natives as 
"citizens of the United States or Alaska," but do not speak to 
obligations owed to Natives as "Indians or members of Indian 
tribes" under federal law. 
Continuation of "Federal programs primarily designed to bene­
fit Native people,"9 5 i.e., Indian programs, are contingent on 
future reports to Congress: 
[T]he Secretary is authorized and directed, together
with other appropriate agencies of the United States 
Government, to make a study of all Federal programs pri­
marily designed to benefit Native people and to report
back to Congress with his recommendations for the future 
management and operation of these programs within three 
years of December 18, 19 7lr 96 
The implication of this order is that federal Indian programs in 
Alaska can continue into the future. Then again, they could also 
be terminated, depending on the findings of the Secretary. The 
Section 2(c) review is still in progress after nearly 10 years. 
Case contends "once (such entitlements) are established they can­
not be administratively limited without rulemaking and other ade-
quate due process . ., 9 7 This conclusion is supported by Section 
2(b)'s mandate for "maximum participation by Natives in decisions 
affecting their rights and property. 1198 
Case recognizes, however, that the Congress at all times 
retains "the plenary authority to create or withdraw such 
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entitlements" without the procedural limitations imposed upon 
administrators.99 When the Congress terminates such entitle-
ments, which together comprise the special relationship, it must 
do so with clear language or legislative history expressing such 
an intent .100 ANCSA does not suggest termination on its face, 
and in fact, specifically negates such an intent in the legisla­
tive and executive history of its passage.101 
Case succinctly offers the best argument against the implica­
tion of terminationist intent in the ANCSA Section 2 (b) policy 
statement.102 To sumarize, it is the settlement which must be 
accomplished without the "creation of a reservation system or 
lengthy wardship or trusteeship," without regard to the con-
tinuing special relationship. Any pre-existing trust or special 
relationship is then left intact, as are pre-existing special tax 
privileges and special federal relations with Natives. Such an 
analysis is consistent with the statutory rule of construction 
applied to Native legislation, i.e., it must be read in the light 
most favorable to Natives. 
While it is inevitable that ANCSA will be a major con-
sideration in any reevaluation of the federal government's rela­
tionship with Alaska Natives, its limited land settlement objec­
tive and corporate economic development goals restricts the Act's 
utility in deciding questions concerning human service needs of 
Native individuals and communities, and questions concerning 
Native government and "tribal status." 
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Congress found and declared in the policy of the Act that 
"there (was) an immediate need for a fair and just settlement of 
all claims. . based on aboriginal land claims." An amendment 
to the Act in 1976 reiterates this limitation: 
The payments and grants authorized under this chapter
constitute compensation for the extinguishment of claims 
to land, and shall not be deemed to substitute for any
governmental programs otherwise available to the Native 
people of Alaska as citizens of the United States and 
the State of Alaska,103 
An accounting of the legislative lobbying of ANCSA makes it clear 
that human service and Native governance concerns were nearly 
inconsequential in comparison with land bartering between 
Natives, the Congress, and the State of Alaska.104 Extraordinary 
emphasis on land conveyancing and corporate business management 
over the past 10 years of ANCSA implementation testify to the 
narrow focus of the land claims. 
Despite ANCSA's failure to resolve pressing human service and 
Native governance questions, the State of Alaska, in correspon­
dence with Alaska's congressional delegates, has argued that the 
purposes and structure of ANCSA support the contention that 
Alaska Native villages do not possess any of the attributes of 
Native self-governance.105 The Attorney General's letters 
further contend that Alaska Native villages under ANCSA do not 
possess "tribal status," and that "Indian country" does not exist 
in the state, thereby precluding even IRA claims to tribal juris-
diction. Finally, the state argues that the absence of any truly 
self-governing Alaska Native entities (except Metlakatla) implic­
itly supports the extension of state municipal governments into 
these Native communities. 
Particularly in regards to the vitality of Alaska Native 
governments, the Attorney General's letters reek of misinforma­
tion. The letters totally disregard the provision for Native 
self-government under Section 16 of the IRA and the concurrent 
jurisdiction provisions made applicable to traditional and IRA 
Native communities in Alaska pursuant to Pub. L. No. 83-280 and 
as construed by case law.106 It is just this kind of misinfor­
mation which should compel Native organizations to propose a plan 
for future federal and Native cooperation based on concepts of 
Native sovereignty. If Natives and their organizations do not 
act, such broad interpretations of the purposes and structure of 
ANCSA may lead to de facto termination of their tribal status, 
appurtenant rights and benefits. 
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II. ANCSA: Its Role in an Age of Self-Determination 
A. We suggest that something more than traditional legal
research of statutes and case law is necessary to understand the 
federal trust relationship as it has evolved in Alaska. Acts and 
pronouncements of the Executive branch and its agents have per­
sistently lead the way for Congressional and judicial definition 
of the trust relationship. These then must then be researched. 
No better nor more significant example of this phenomenon can 
be offered than the July 8 , 1970 message to Congress on "Indian 
Self-Determination. 1110 7 Its direct progeny was the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act. 108
The Self-determination policy as articulated by Nixon on that 
date deserves close scrutiny in 1981 as the federal trust rela­
tionship is questioned and tested by unilateral redefinitions of 
federal commitments to Alaska Natives by federal agencies. 
Self-determination spoke to more than unfettered control over 
land and resources vested in Native corporations or the freedom 
of stockholders to choose directors within the construct of ANCSA 
as a legislative solution to land claims. 109 
The Self-determination policy was set forth by Nixon and 
reiterated by him as a description of the context in which trans-
actions such as ANCSA would occur. It provided, by explicitly 
rejecting termination as an objective of federal Indian policy, a 
guarantee. Indian tribes could seek greater autonomy and control 
over their own well-being without concern that this quest for 
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self-direction would be employed as a rationale for federal 
withdrawal of its historical protection and support when that 
protection and support was still desired by American Indian 
tribes. 
Nixon well understood that oscillation between "forced ter­
mination and constant paternalism 11llO (or what Wilkinson refers 
to as between assimilation and separation111) in federal Indian 
policy had left Indian groups deeply apprehensive. 
"Any step that might result in greater social, economic or 
political autonomy is regarded with suspicion by many Indians who 
fear that it will only bring them closer to the day when the 
federal government will disavow its responsibility and cut them 
adrift. 11 2 
"Self-determination Without Termination, 11 13 said Nixon would 
occur only when these "formal and informal agreements 11114 between 
the federal government and Indian people which form the basis of 
the trusteeship relationship were viewed as something other than 
unilateral commitments to a disadvantaged people. 11 5 
Nixon's interpretation of the federal relationship 
(apparently acknowledged as formed out of more than statutes and 
treaties) is important to reiterate. In exchange for surrender 
of "claims to vast tracts of land," ( as well as acceptance of 
life on reservations for some), "the government has agreed to 
provide community services such as health, education and public 
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safety, services which would presumably allow Indian communities 
to enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of other 
Americans. 11 116 
"(T)he special relationship between the Indian tribes and the 
federal government which arises from these agreements," said 
Nixon, "continues to carry immense moral and legal force. To 
terminate this relationship would be no more appropriate than to 
terminate the citizenship rights of any other American. 11 117 
Thus, to encourage and implement policies of self-
determination, it would be necessary to assuage the "threat of 
eventual termination." 
Said Nixon: "We must assure the Indian that he can assume 
control of his own life without being separated involuntarily 
from the tribal group. And we must make it clear that Indians 
can become independent of federal control without being cut off 
from federal concern and federal support. 11 118 
The key to what Nixon viewed as a new direction in federal 
Indian policy was for the federal government to acknowledge what 
could be termed a contractual responsibility to Indians based 
upon claims surrendered by them. It was left for Indian groups 
to amend the relationship, to contract for control or operation 
of federal programs or to seek removal from federal constraints 
in particularized areas without, at the same time, putting into 
question an ongoing federal commitment. 
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"(W) e have turned from the question of whether the federal 
government has a responsibility to Indians to the question of how 
that responsibility can best be fulfilled, 11 119 said Nixon. 
Relevance to the Claims Settlement 
Nixon's recitation of legislative initiatives in his special 
message to Congress on Self-Determination in 1970 did not include 
the claims settlement. Yet in his annual message to Congress in 
1974, the settlement act was cited first among the accomplish­
ments of his administration "to encourage Indians and their 
tribal governments to play an increasing role in determining 
their own future. 11 120 
The historical record shows that Nixon's articulation of 
self-determination marked a turning point in the Executive's sup­
port of the Alaska Native position on a claims settlement.121 
"Without consulting with Native leaders, President Nixon let 
it be known that he wanted the sentiments of his self-
determination message to be embodied in the claims settlement. 
"The head of the Domestic Council, John Erlichman, who spoke 
for the President, was the final arbiter in the drafting 
process.11122 
The administration bill proffered one billion dollars and 
forty million acres and provided access to the drafting process 
to Alaska Natives for the first time.123 
This early administration version of the settlement did not 
-40-
provide for the structure of regional corporations which Native 
leadership desired. Yet this is not the critical point. What 
began was a process of negotiation between the White House and 
Native leadership that by early 1971 was seen to eclipse even the 
alliance of Natives with oil companies.124 
We suggest that the published and unpublished record will 
reveal that Nixon's self-determination doctrine was the context 
within which land claims was settled. That the settlement could 
proceed within the context of a continuing web of federal-tribal 
obligations was the critical material representation of this 
agreement to Alaska Natives by the federal government. 
Should the Alaska Natives have relied on Nixon's Presidential 
pronouncement especially when it was not adopted, letter-by-
letter, in ANCSA? Was it merely the siren song of a wiley 
statesman who hoped to bewitch Native activists and cause them to 
ignore the traditional basis of federal Indian law in 
congressional acts and treaties? 
Whatever Nixon's motivation, we believe that the historical 
record will form the basis upon which Alaska Natives may argue 
that they were indeed entitled to rely on this high-placed pro­
nouncement of the Executive.125 
The Executive branch and its agencies are everywhere respon­
sible for the execution and administration of the trust relation-
ship. But in the territory and new state of Alaska, the 
Executive department's connection with the formation and adminis-
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tration of the trust relationship is unique. Where the Congress 
has not spoken, or more often, spoken with reference to reserva­
tion Indians, Executive agents have time and again constructed 
Alaskan policy through regulation, order, correspondence or act. 
Because of this special role of the Executive in Alaska, 
Alaskan Natives look first to the Executive to give substance and 
effect to various programs managed under the trust, to ameliorate 
differences that Natives have confronted as different agencies 
have acted on Alaska and to provide a federal view on the defini­
tion and scope of the relationship. 
Not only has the Executive formed the operative arm of 
federal Indian policy, but it has often played the functional 
role of leading the Congress to employ this policy in new 
legislation. Once enacted, it is the Executive in conjunction 
with the courts who define legislation, communicate its meaning 
and set the tone of regulation. 
President Nixon acknowledged this role even as he showed sym­
pathy for the position of Alaska Natives. They believed they 
could take independent steps superior to those of the Executive 
to improve their own situation within the federal relationship 
and communicate their needs to Congress. 
The legislative record also is replete with expressions by 
members of Congress which suggest that Congress fully intended 
the settlement to proceed without fear of future termination of 
-42-
the trust relationship as an expression of self-determination. 126 
Both executive and legislative records require deeper 
historical exploration. Both these (and, to an extent the lan­
guage of the Actl27) make clear that ANCSA was no substitution 
for other commitments, both formal and informal. For it to have 
been a substitute for these responsibilities would have signaled 
the very betrayal by the federal government which (Nixon had 
correct ly perceived) Indian groups had come to fear, if and when 
they sought or manifested any independence from federal pater­
nalism. 
Why then are we faced with the present crisis over the con­
tinuing viability of the trust relationship? Why should land 
claims have brought about such a test of the ultimate federal 
political obligation owed Native groups in A laska? 
One reason is that there is confusion evident in post-ANCSA 
acts by the Executive branch and the Congress in relating to what 
are separate but coordinate principles, that of tribal 
sovereignty and that of Indian self-determination. 
This confusion should not be surprising. The principle of 
self-determination evolved in an international legal context. It 
was evoked in the context of American foreign relations prior to 
its adoption as the cornerstone of federal Indian policy. 
Perhaps because of its employment by Presidents Wilson and 
Truman in matters international it conveys to the uninformed that 
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its ideological message is an ultimate declaration of indepen­
dence by peoples who have the means and potential to free them­
selves from domination of other nation states. Yet self­
determination has been applied to non-sovereign peoples entirely 
dominated by the nation states in which they reside.128 Further, 
it speaks to choices made by non-sovereign ( or semi-sovereign) 
peoples in furthering their own social, cultural and economic 
development. 
Thus, agreements between nation states and peoples which are 
expressions of self-determination should be viewed, as one com­
mentator put it, as procedural mechanisms employed within the 
context of political relationships between peoples and nation 
states, whatever those relationships might be.129 
In his articulation of the doctrine of self-determination, 
President Nixon sought to separate analytically potential oppor­
tunities for self-defermination from the second issue of obliga­
tions owed and commitments between Indian tribes and the federal 
government. 
Yet the then present state of affairs of most "lower 48" 
Indian nations to whom Nixon related his doctrine left ambiguous 
the practical separation of the twin principles of commitments 
between sovereigns and support for acts of self-determination. 
Nixon did not want to frighten reservation tribes by 
suggesting removal of the lid of federal guardianship over reser­
vation resources as he sought to convince them that self-
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determination could occur without fear of unilateral removal of 
the federal protection. Thus, he offered examples within the 
context of the same "federal paternalism" that he decried and 
left it to tribes to articulate for themselves alternative 
examples if they chose to do so. 13 0 While this was precisely in 
the spirit of doctrine pronounced, it left a lingering confusion 
between issues of shared governance critical to the trust respon­
sibility and issues of independent development for Native 
American life within or outside of the context of tribal gover­
nance. His examples reflected the position of reservation 
Indians where Indian governments, often mirror images of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, have reservation-wide governance over 
many culturally and politically discrete Indian communities. In 
that context, the Interior Department retained substantial 
control over resource development. 131 
For these reasons, examples of self-determination were 
defined as transfers to recognized Indian governments of control 
over established programs and money, or, in the case of education 
programs, control by smaller Indian communities within the cor­
porate tribe with the permission of the overriding tribal 
government. 13 2 
The opportunities for sel £-determination through mechanisms 
formed separate and apart from individual tribal units and Indian 
control over property freed from federal trusteeship existed only 
in Alaska. 133 
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A formula for land claims advocated by Native leaders (but 
not the federal bureaucracy or state) stressed this division 
between sovereignty ( as a basis for determining entitlement to 
land claims) and extratribal corporate management of economic 
development of resources flowing from a land settlement. 
The Native advocated format for implementation of land claims 
was a true expression of the middle road between termination and 
smothering paternal ism that Nixon sought to evoke for federal 
Indian pol icy. Other claims pressed in the period, for example 
the return of the sacred Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblo and the 
reconstruction of a trust relationship with the Menominee tribe, 
spoke to reassertions of tribal sovereign control and renewals of 
the federal guardianship and not, accurately, to self­
determination which flows from a secure trust relationship. 
It may well be that ANCSA was the only pure expression of 
self-determination. It was cast, by its terms, merely as a pro­
cedural mechanism for economic development to be employed, as 
guaranteed by Nixon, without fear of interference with the 
federal trust obligation owed to recognized Indian groups. 
Yet a further complication probably created the present, 
dangerous impasse. Native leadership fought for a settlement 
which was not exclusively village-oriented. It viewed state 
schemes which were village-oriented as ploys to dissipate the 
control over land and resources necessary to engage in develop­
ment of claims resources.134 
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Native villages have historically been the closest approxima­
tion of "tribes" within the context of federal Indian law in 
Alaska. Was this shift in control of claims resources as adopted 
by the Congress an attempt at de-tribalization of Indians who 
partook of it as members of recognized Alaska Native villages? 
The short answer is no, when the Act is offered as the most 
accurate example of Nixon's self-determination doctrine. The 
longer answer is that later congressional activity and provisions 
of the Claims Act itself, muddied the distinction between Alaskan 
tribes as recognized sovereign entities and Alaska Native cor­
porations, both profit and non-profit, as vehicles for specific, 
limited experiments in self-determination which Alaska Natives 
chose to undertake. 
Deterioration of the Entitlement Powers of Alaska Native Tribes. 
A fundamental power of Indian tribes is to determine their 
members.13 5 With some exceptions, federal entitlement programs, 
which form the basis of the trust relationship, discover who are 
in fact entitled as Alaska Natives by requesting proof of tribal 
membership.136 There are dangerous signs that this tribal 
authority has been ignored since ANCSA was passed and signed. 
We find, for example, recognized villages under ANCSA and 
recognized enrollees 137 under ANCSA designated as the tribes and 
the Indian members for whom federal legislation has been passed, 
thus potentially removing from further consideration at least 
half of the Alaska Native population. Tribal units are denied 
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the ultimate authority in determining tribal membership. 
We find the term "tribe" employed to include other more 
encompassing units of Native population in order to reflect imme­
diate organizational necessities for control and delivery of 
services. Such a loose designation of "tribes" disempowers the 
tribal units now recognized within the context of the traditional 
federal trust relationship. 138 
Finally, we find very limited energy expended on development 
of tribal uni ts as other than components or subcomponents of 
state government. It may well be that villages are anachronistic 
mechanisms to meet demands for social and economic change more 
appropriately based in regions. Yet they and not regional orga­
nizations ( absent now-denied explicit congressional recognition 
of regions as tribes139 ) are most clearly the traditional tribal 
unit understood to be party to the formal and informal commit­
ments which shape the federal trust relationship with Alaska 
Natives. Issues of administrative inconvenience which cause 
efficient non-profit corporation management to seek less encum­
bered ties to federal aid and support and negative check-offs 
from villages140 pale into insignificance� levels of "village 
input" or "local control" will be measured as indicators of 
either continued existence of traditional Native tribes in Alaska 
- or indicators of their disappearance as Natives shift their 
relationship to programmatic or developmental organizations. 
One can argue that it is in the state's interest for villages 
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to disappear as tribal uni ts. However, given the capacity of 
state and federal government planners to form or revoke commit­
ments of resources to non-tribal units, it is not ultimately in 
the interest of Alaska Natives for village tribes to wither into 
insignificance and disuse. 141 
Self-Determination and the Role of Intermediaries in Delivery of 
Services 
Non-profit regional corporations have undertaken the role of 
reservation tribal governments in contracting for management of 
federal programs under the Indian Self-Determination Act. 142 So, 
also, has the state government assumed larger roles in providing 
what Nixon viewed as commitments by the federal government to 
provide services to American Indians at least on a level as 
received by state other citizens . 
It is entirely appropriate to design and transfer managerial 
and implementational responsibilities to new bodies separate from 
individual tribal units. There is a long tradition of such dele­
gation of authority by the federal government to intermediate 
entities from missionary groups to the Coast Guard to the terri­
torial government. l4 3 This has occurred for reasons based on 
pragmatic considerations of who is in the field and capable of 
acting rather than from any overt desire to terminate federal 
responsibility for programs directed to Indians . 
Involvement of the relatively new state of Alaska in delivery 
of educational services, management of natural resources and 
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delivery of basic legal services also appears natural when viewed 
against the backdrop of Alaska's special history as a federal 
colony of longstanding in which Natives without reservations 
resided. There was no need for reservations in Alaska because 
territorial and Native claims over governance did not conflict 
with the same level of intensity as they did in Western states. 
The federal government was able to umpire conflicts between each 
group. Both were subject to its ultimate authority. 
Yet what cannot be overlooked in this disbursal of primary 
responsibility for management and delivery of governmental serv­
ice is that both the federal government and the village tribes 
should have some clear and apparent role in establishing stan­
dards of service and in moni taring the delivery of service by 
intermediaries. The trust relationship need not bear the direct 
responsibility for such services. But it must be perceived as 
the ultimate sanctioning and sustaining authority for such posi­
tive developments in state and private activity on behalf of 
Alaska Natives as tribal members. 
As one surveys the role of intermediaries, examples, both 
positive and negative, can be drawn from the record to prove or 
to disprove that collaboration between the federal government and 
the tribes forms the backdrop for management of programs and 
service to Alaska Natives by non-profits and by the state. 
The evolution of the Association of Village Council 
Presidents in the early 1960's as a forum to judge the impact of 
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state liquor laws on villages and, later, to undertake federal 
responsibilities contractually is a good example of village 
guidance through intermediaries with the explicit blessing and 
collaboration of the Interior Department.144 
The structure of village education as it has evolved through 
legislative settlement of the Hootch decision presents a picture 
that is both positive and negative.145 It is negative as 
conflict has emerged over the ultimate control of schools within 
the districts, pitting administrators against village uni ts in 
what appears to be tests of ultimate authority over school 
progrms. The merits of the dispute are not the issue here. When 
disputes, perhaps natural to relationships between intermediaries 
and villages over administrative issues, become public disputes 
over political authority, they create evidence that the con­
tinuing authority of tribal units is, itself, the underlying 
issue. This is more dangerous than the outcome of individual 
disputes over teacher hiring authority or curriculum content. 
A similar positive and negative situation to that of state 
decentralized education exists in the North Slope Borough where 
authority for police service and other powers have been handed 
over by villages to a boroughwide authority.146 Congressionally 
acknowledged authority also exists in the regionwide IRA council 
(and in at least one IRA village). Yet questions arise when two 
uni ts of government, both Native controlled, but one state and 
one tribal, exist in the same place. The borough is flush with 
resources drawn from property taxes. The IRA unit manages some 
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federal programs. Some indication of mutual regard and mutual 
collaboration at least over the level of service based on prop­
erty taxes would serve to protect tribal government even as state 
borough units manage the lion's share of service delivery. 
Competition for programs tends to suggest that tribal government 
is a mere shadow of its former self and has been replaced. 
As indicated in the 1977 Senate hearings on regional tribes, 
there is a diversity of opinion and situations in rural Alaska 
regarding the extent and utility of collaboration between state 
and tribal governmental uni ts. There is no one pat solution. 
Still, in 1981, the appearance of tribal government involvement 
is as important as the activities which it directly seeks to 
undertake. 
In the realm of natural resources the recently enacted ANILCA 
presents a design which suggests that state management will be 
subject to federal scrutiny on behalf of rural (not Native) 
Alaskans. As a recent Congressional expression of intent, it is 
a useful guide for positioning the federal trust relationship as 
a backdrop to matters now made subject to state management.147 
The Indian Child Welfare Act, although flawed with status 
designations of villages and Natives as "land claims Indians," 
provides an opening for village or multi-village tribal units to 
retain exclusive jurisdiction over some custody cases involving 
village children and residents.148 Evocation of the Act's oppor­
tunities for villages to receive notice in some state proceedings 
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and to remove some cases to its own institutions has not been 
backed by an equal commitment of federal funds to develop courts 
and programs. Nonetheless as a recent congressional recognition 
of the continuing existence of village governments as tribal 
governments, it presents opportunities which should be seized if 
not to save children from involuntary placement or adoption out­
side of Native groups, then to demonstrate continuing vitality of 
tribal units even in the midst of state legal activity. 
As Native Alaskans review the working relationships between 
villages and state and private entities, they must consider how 
to underscore village tribal sovereignty even as they look to 
supravillage units to manage and deliver programs. 
As the above examples suggest, the form of these rela-
tionships will vary. Concurrent jurisdiction over civil matters 
is apparently maintained through Public Law 280 and through 
Indian Reorganization Act communities. 149 Whether or not an 
attempt is made to mount parallel governing structures, some 
clear procedural regard for tribal evaluation of service 
offerings must be grafted onto working arrangements with state 
and regional units and religiously adhered to if the federal com­
mitment is to be protected and preserved. 
As we will relate in our recommendations, we believe that it 
is left to stronger "quasigovernments" and boroughs to assist in 
the revitalization of village units. Unless intermediaries are 
prepared to make explicit in their working agreements significant 
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village authority in the design and evaluation of services and 
make clear to federal and state contractors that real authority 
rests in that place, then de facto termination and not self­
determination will have occurred even without congressional ini­
tiatives to end the trust relationship. 
We suggest that history provides very good explanations for 
how Native Alaskans came to accept land claims and reasonable 
program management by entities other than tribes. 
However, it is left to villages and regional groups to rework 
their own relationships in order to demonstrate that the achieve­
ments of the past ten years have not destroyed tribal authority 
in Alaska. Only then can Alaska Natives demand that the federal 
government fulfill its commitment to self-determination without 
termination. 
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III. The Threat of Termination.
Throughout this report we have made reference to the terms 
"termination" and "de-tribalization." Simply stated, termination 
means the cessation of the federal-tribal relationship whether 
esablished through treaty or otherwise. Statutory termination of 
the federal relationship with Natives normally cannot occur 
unless it is the clear intent of the statutory language or 
legislative history. 150 However, legislation can have a 
"terminationist" effect. Without explanation or refutation, it 
will result in de facto termination. 
Terminationist policy arose in the 1950 's when Congressional 
hopes for the rapid assimilation of tribes by means of the IRA 
began to fade .1 5l The attempt to springboard or assimilate the 
Indian into the mainstream of the economy in the IRA's was ham-
pered by administrative restraints. The answer, in the view of 
conservative congressmen, was seen to be affording the Indian 
individual the full brunt ( or full opportunity) of competitive 
society. 
The thrust of the policy was: (1) to eliminate reservations:
(2) to turn Indian affairs over to the states, and (3) to make
Indians subject to state control without federal support restric­
tions. ( 4) Indian land would no longer be held in trust and 
would be fully taxable and alienable (just like non-Indian land 
in states): and (5) special federal health, education, and 
general assistance programs for Indians would end. 152 The first 
four of these objectives of termination policy have already been 
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accomplished in large measure in Alaska,153 or are in 
progress.154 The question remaining is how long the special 
relationship based on programs involving factor number five 
(e.g., (special federal health, education, and general assistance 
programs for Indians) will survive. Transfers and defunding by 
the Reagan administration tell us that the substance of the rela­
tionship is very near its end. 
As we have evidenced, the rationale for a special federal 
relationship with Natives or other American Indians was and 
remains founded in their identity as separate and distinct 
societies (i.e., Indian tribes) who over time came to rely on 
federal protection of their society and its values by means of 
treaty, statute, or agreement. This protection goes beyond those 
afforded mere racial minorities in the United States. Indeed, 
legally, Indians have been granted a political status, not only a 
racial one .155 This status has allowed the government greater 
leverage in its efforts to assist Indian tribes in their socio-
economic development. In short, Natives derive their political 
rights under federal laws in their identity as members of 
"tribes," and not only on the basis of their individual racial 
classification (i.e., Alaska Native). 
Even where the tribal unit is intact, however, early termina­
tionists attempted to reduce federal work forces and services in 
Indian programs available to the tribes. Four factors have 
historically been identified and considered in implementing such 
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plans: (1) degree of acculturation: (2) economic resources and 
condition of the tribe: (3) willingness of the tribe to be 
relieved of federal services: and (4) willingness of the state to 
assume jurisdiction. These factors were proposed in a 1947 
report from the acting commissioner of the BIA. 156 The original 
request for the report came from the Senate Civil Service 
Committee which recommended a gradual "discharge of the federal 
government's obligation. . at the earliest possible date com­
patible with the government's trustee responsibility. 11 157 This 
mood of federal service reduction produced by a conservative 
Congress in the early 1950's is appearing again in the 1980's. 
The Reagan administration employment of a criteria to deter­
mine the "truly needy" when combined with recent transfers of 
regulatory jurisdiction over subsistence hunting and schools to 
the State of Alaska suggests the use of implementation criteria 
very similar to the four factors recommended by Commissioner 
Zimmerman in 1947. Alaska Natives have adapted to the cash econ-
omy and have in many regards "adopted the white man's ways" 
(e.g., by a faulty government standard, they have been 
acculturated). Moreover, the corporate "tribes" in Alaska are on 
the whole financial success stories and in the hands of competent 
management. 158 Depending on one's definition of "tribe" in 
Alaska, an argument can be made that "tribes" wish to be relieved 
of federal services at least so far as federal lands trust man-
agement encumber corporate resources. The State of Alaska has 
willingly accepted ( if not fully acted upon) jurisdiction over 
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Natives both as to civil and criminal jurisdictionl59 as well as 
regu 16latory jurisdiction over particular programs . 0 Under the 
terminationist criteria, the federal government could easily 
justify extracting itself from the business of Indian trust 
responsibilities in Alaska. It already may have done so. 
The chain of congressional legislation directed at Alaska 
Natives leads to the conclusion that the factors which comprise 
the thrust of termination policy have occurred in Alaska. In 
that none of the legis lation is labeled termination, we can only 
say that its results are the beginning of a de facto termination. 
First, with the exception of Metlakatla, what few reser­
vations were created in the state, either by statute or executive 
order, were revoked by ANCSA. 161 The only remaining trust lands 
are Native allotments which can eventually be converted to fee 
title in the Native owner and the single reservation. 16 2 Second, 
PL 280 conferred exclusive criminal and concurrent, but preemp­
tive, civi jurisdiction upon the state. 163 l Third, lands trans­
ferred to Native corporations and individuals under ANCSA are 
fully a 16lienable. 4 The limited restrictions on stock alienation 
merely put off until a later date the time when considerab ly more 
Native control over assets and land can be alienated, by transfer 
of corporate control. Final ly, recent regulatory transfers to 
the state and administrative defunding proposals ref lect further 
reductions in federal support or in restrictions traditionally 
imposed against states in matters concerning Native affairs . 165 
All five factors which denote termination policy figure into 
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current federal Indian affairs as applied to Alaska. 
The only remaining question is, how will Natives respond? 
IV. Conclusion.
Indians and Alaska Natives partake in a special relationship
with the United States government not enjoyed by mere racial 
minorities. The origin of this relationship lies in the politi-
cal identity of Natives as separate and sovereign tribal peoples 
and in the history of the course of dealing between their 
11 tribes II and the federal government. As a consequence, Natives 
shoulder the burden of maintaining some semblance of a Na ti ve 
community and a recognized "tribal II identity in order to retain 
the benefits and protections provided by the special rela­
tionship. Without the political status of a "tribal" identity, 
the Native becomes just another racial minority in the eyes of 
the federal government and loses the special relationship. 
The Congress has not terminated the federal relationship with 
Alaska Native "tribes." It has muddled the appropriate federal 
response by creating special purpose authority "tribes" and left 
a residue of confusion in its wake. Yet it has reaffirmed the 
tribal government authority of villages in the recent Indian 
Child Welfare Act and provided some opportunities for tribal 
activity, at least in principle. Further, it has offered a use­
ful formula for future relationships between the federal govern­
ment, the tribes and the state in the ANILCA legislation on sub­
sistence management. 
-59-
ANILCA offers an opportunity for the state to manage fish and 
wildlife on public lands with special priorities for subsistence 
takings and with an oversight role reserved in the federal 
government. Similar transfers are occurring or are provided in 
new amendments to the Marine Mammal Protection Act and in the BIA 
school operation and management. Such transfers of federal man-
agement and service obligations are not unusual in the history of 
Alaska. Established standards for federal oversight, however, 
are. Oversight by the federal government imlies as a prereq­
uisite that standards are established through dialogue with 
Alaska tribal government, standards against which to measure 
service provided by governmental or quasi-governmental inter­
mediaries to whom authority has been delegated by the federal 
government. 
There are three possible bases for such performance 
standards: 
( 1 ) services comparable to those previous ly provided 
directly by federal agencies; 
(2) services comparable to those received by non-Native 
recipients of the state; l66 
(3) services "which would presumably allCJv.T Indian com­
munities to enjoy a standard of living comparable to 
that of other Americans. 11 16 7 
Case makes the point that enforcement of the trust respon­
sibility depends on the presence of an established obligation.168 
Moreover, where the obligation exists, some standard of perform-
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ance must be established. We argue that oversight and standard 
setting, as well as the obligation itself, can be inferred from 
Executive acts and legislation, It is clear, however, that the 
initiative rests with Alaska Native organizations to induce these 
Executive activities. 
Reed Chambers argues that if the chief objective of the trust 
relationship is to protect the tribal status as self-governing 
entities, equitable relief will be necessary where extinguishment 
of tribal land case diminishes the territory over which tribal 
authority is exercised and thereby perils fulfillment of the 
guarantee of political and cultural autonomy.169 
We would go a step further and suggest that where, as in 
Alaska, there has been a wholehearted commitment to and reliance 
upon self-determination as the road to political and cultural 
autonomy, the Executive must be held responsible for maintenance 
of the fibre of the trust relationship since it provides a con­
text for this selective development. 
In the Alaska context, a process of standard articulation 
achieved through negotiation between tribal uni ts, the federal 
government and intermediaries is the evident first step. 
Consideration of equitable relief should be held in abeyance 
until and unless it is evident that the Executive branch will not 
embark on this process. This will only mean that it has embarked 
through inaction, confusion or intent upon a dangerous policy of 
de facto termination. 
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We recommend that the Alaska Native Foundation and the Tanana 
Chiefs Association, armed with recently acquired grant monies, 170 
study more than internal legal issues related to ANCSA or 
village-state relationships. Each should focus on the federal 
context of ANCSA and of local-state relations. 
Goals of further work should be: 
First, to establish through historical as well as further 
legal research that the present policy of self-determination 
implemented through intermediaries follows logically from the 
historical development of Indian policy in Alaska - especially as 
it pertains to the reliance upon Executive representations, to 
the persistent equation of Native villages as tribes and to the 
persistent delegations of authority to intermediaries to carry 
out policy - even before the self-determination era. 
Second, to establish that Nixon's policy of self-
determination reflected in congressional legislation mandated 
continuing federal trust responsibilities. 
From this base, the third step should be a very careful anal­
ysis of the relationship between Native villages and governmental 
and non-governmental authorities now engaged in federal 
res pons ibilities. This process may involve innovative restruc­
turing at the village level. No one denies the need to obtain 
economic strength in Native businesses which, in turn, can sup­
port Native comm unities. ANCSA was not on its face a social 
welfare act, but it can severely impact the social well-being of 
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Native communities. 171 The analysis of the relationship between 
Native villages and governmental and non-governmental authorities 
was begun by Case in his landmark study but has not yet resulted 
in critical rethinking and reordering of these relationships 
necessary to argue from a firm evidentiary basis that Alaska 
Native tribes are alive and well. 
Revitalization of tribal relationships with governmental and 
quasi-governmental units will perhaps have a secondary effect of 
protecting some for-profit corporations from takeovers in 1991. 
It will also lay the basis for requests that the federal govern­
ment take on the collaborative process of standard setting and 
oversight required to maintain the trust relationship through 
these dark times. 
We do not argue for a return to federal paternalism, desired 
neither by Natives in the modern era nor by the federal govern­
ment. We do argue for a working relationship between the federal 
bureaucracy and tribes which can be employed should the state or 
other intermediaries fail to live up to their commitments. 
Our position should imply no disrespect for the many non­
tribal Native organizations who have taken Alaska Natives to this 
place in their history. We must deal with reality as we see it. 
The Congress has buried a bill to establish regional tribes. The 
state has shown time and again its dis favor to tribes, even in 
the face of federal legislation. 
It is left to Natives to organize for the revitalization of 
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the core relationship between tribes and the federal government. 
As in the past, the fight will be long and hard. But not to 
fight is to risk misinterpretation of the historical record and 
death of the trust relationship in 1991, exactly when it may well 
be most needed as a political safety net. 
Additional Specific Recommendations 
( 1) Federal oversight of service and other transfers of 
federal programs has not been coordinated among transferors, 
tranferees and the tribes. As important to Natives and the state 
as land exchanges, the burdens imposed in the transfers warrant 
the formation of a Joint Service and Oversight Planning 
Commission. The Commission would ensure that all tranfers were 
effected in the most efficient manner with due regard to the 
needs of Natives, the state, and the federal government in their 
oversight role. 
( 2) Village corporation options. The divisive effects of 
individual stock ownership at the village level combined with the 
undue burdens of a for-profit corporate form at that level 
warrant efforts to provide options to village corporations and 
Native villages to reincorporate as non-profits or allow mergers 
with inclusive IRA's. Both plans open village membership to all 
Native residents, and allow local development to proceed for the 
benefit of the community. Community business can develop while 
the tribal unit is preserved through group action and a land 
base. Congressional support is much more likely for a village 
level restructuring, given these corporations' general lack of 
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"success" and the prospective community divisions facing villages 
and village corporations in contrast to the ANCSA' s legislative 
intent that the village corporations be the primary culture 
bearers. 
( 3 ) Extension of the 1991 deadline. The merits of the 
Native argument are obvious: delayed conveyances defeated the 
underlying objective of the Act which was to create economically 
secure business entities within the 20 year period. (This 
discounts the other reason which was to give the state and 
federal governments time to pay off the monetary settlement 
debt.) Another reason compelling Native action is that if they 
wish to strengthen tribal units, they will need land or at least 
the political power held by Native corporations to effect such 
changes. When stock becomes alienable in 1991, Native power in 
the state will be a function of the degree to which they maintain 
ownership and control of their ANCSA corporations. Landless 
tribes are difficult to maintain: landless and powerless tribes 
are never heard and wither quickly. 
1991 - The Real Issue 
The real issue in 1991 will be whether Alaska Natives will be 
effectively selling the last vestiges of their federally 
recognized tribal identity if they choose to sell their shares in 
regional and village corporations. 
If corporations have for all intents and purposes by then 
replaced tribes in the eyes of the Executive then the answer will 
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be yes. It will be of little comfort to know that the statutory 
tribes with which they are severing connections were not really 
tribes at all in the eyes of federal Indian law and its 
obligations. 
If this unhappy situation is to be avoided, it must be 
established now before it is too late that stock ownership and 
tribal membership are two separate and important matters. Or, 
that in the case of stock ownership in village corporations (the 
less marketable of equities in most situations), that the land 
base of these businesses has been sufficiently controlled by 
villages so that stock owners can view their tribal rights and 
stock ownership as complementary and mutually self-sustaining. 
With merely ten years remaining before the cap is put on the 
settlement process, we are a long way from arriving at the 
necessary separation of tribalism from capitalism in the minds of 
villagers, corporate and tribal leaders and state and federal 
bureaucrats. 
We urge a return to the operating premises of federal Indian 
law as they explain tribal sovereignty and Indian self-
determination. Unless Alaska Natives are themselves cognizant of 
the difference between membership in tribes and ownership of cor­
porations, it is most unlikely that political actors in the 
non-Native community will be understanding of or symphathetic to 
the difference. Although we have focused upon confusion between 
the two when created by the federal government, as it articulated 
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and implemented self-determination policy in Alaska, it would be 
less than honest to deny that the confusion has also arisen out 
of opportunistic quests for political, economic and social power 
by Native organizations. 
Could this confusion have been avoided? Probably not, 
unless Alaska Natives had been left to endure longtime patterns 
of federal and state neglect and disdain. Alaska Natives reached 
for power in ways that were innovative. These same proven polit­
ical skills must now be mobilized to disentangle tribal sover­
eignty from other forms of political and economic development. 
The political power and managerial skills developed by Native 
organizations must be put to use to repair and strengthen tribal 
governments as a prelude to serious negotiations with state and 
federal governments. 
Case law alone will not save the situation. Neither will 
statutory language. Neither will high-priced lawyers of the 
1970's or low-priced VISTA volunteers of the 1960's. What must 
occur is a renaissance of tribalism sparked by the same cluster 
of battle-hardened Native leaders who have fought for the 
resource and political base which Natives now possess and must 
fight to retain. 
The historical record can be turned to the advantage of 
Alaska Natives. So can the legal record. But, in the final ana-
lysis, the reality of Native tribes with loyal members, supported 
by strong and sophisticated Native organizations, will prove the 
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determining element. Only active tribes will save the trust 
relationship. 
This then is the moment of truth. 
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Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and The Hunting of the Snark, 
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of an historical record in Oliphant. See also M. Wilson, The 
Federal Trust Responsibility and the Obligation to Provide Health 
Care to Indian People (1980). 
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21 Indian Appropriation Act of 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566, 
25 U.S.C. 71 (Supp. 1980). 
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23 Ratified May 28, 1867, 15 Stat. 539. 
24 See generally Cohen, supra note 20, at 402. 
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40 Id. at 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3). 
41 Id. at§ 1903(8). 
42 Id. at§ 1904(4). 
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120 Nixon 1974, supra note 101, at 75. 
121 Berry, supra note 104, at 148, 153. 
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Natives as citizens of the United States or of Alaska, or 
relieve, replace, or diminish any obligation of the United States 
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order to receive their land base. See ANCSA §§ 1602(i),
1613(c) (3). 
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Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act is in 
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services. Comptroller General, The Indian Self-Determination Act 
-- Many Obstacles Remain 18 (1978). The Navajo Council suggested
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those undertaken under the Self-Determination Act by non-profit
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with author). So is the Tanana Chiefs Conference. See McBeath 
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P.2d 7937'°1975) and McBeath and Morehouse, supra note 89, at 
68-70. 
146 McBeath and Morehouse, supra note 89, at 77-88. 
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167 
170 See letter to Mrs. Placeta Lonewolf, Administration for 
Native Americans, August 11, 1981 (on file Justice Center, 
Anchorage). 
171 Although ANCSA corporations are touted as the protectors
of Native heritage, they are ill-suited for the task. Even now, 
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APPENDIX I 
Historical Aspects 
of the Federal Obligation 
to Alaska Natives 
Stephen Haycox, Ph.D. 
September 1981 
Member of Faculty, 
University of Alaska, Anchorage 
From the purchase of Alaska in 1867, all three branches of 
American federal government have dealt with Alaska Natives in a 
variety of capacities, including service, advice and counsel, and 
advocacy. In the purchase treaty the Congress effectively post-
poned direct action with Alaska Natives, and the executive branch 
was left to establish such contact with and jurisdiction over 
Alaska Natives as the federal government would exercise.1 
This pattern has continued through more than one hundred 
years of interaction between Alaska Natives and the federal 
government. Congress has periodically acted to define and affect 
Alaska Native conditions, but the implementation and interpreta­
tion of such acts has regularly been left to executive agencies 
dealing with Natives and Native communities.2 Also, intermit­
tently, federal courts have defined and affected Alaska Native 
conditions through the adjudication and interpretation of 
legislative enactments, executive activity and litigation.3 
However, normally, implementation has been left primarily to 
federal executive agencies.4 
The executive agency which has established a continuing con­
tact with Alaska Natives is the Bureau of Indian Affairs and its 
direct precursor agencies, the Alaska Native Service and the 
U.S. Bureau of Education. Though not the only executive agency 
to deal with Alaska Natives, 5 BIA has been a primary agency and 
its services and jurisdiction have been sought and acceded to by 
other agencies, including the military.6 
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The Bureau of Indian Affairs is presently organized into an 
area office, headquartered at Juneau, and district agencies in 
Anchorage, Bethel, Nome and Fairbanks. The creation of the area 
office superceded a previous organization, the Alaska Native 
Service, with headquarters at Juneau, and district superintenden­
cies at Unalaska, Fairbanks and Nome.7 The Alaska Native Service 
was not created by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Rather, it was 
taken over from the Bureau of Education in toto in 1931.8 In 
that year, the federal jurisdiction over Alaska Native affairs 
was transferred to BIA by the Interior Department from the Bureau 
of Education, which had exercised the jurisdiction from 1885, 
when a general agent for education was appointed for Alaska, 
responsible to the Commissioner of Education, and through that 
office, to the Secretary of Interior.9 
Examples of executive interpretation and action for Alaska 
Natives are many. Between the purchase of Alaska in 1867 and the 
creation of the general agent for education in 1885, numerous 
executive agents surveyed Native conditions in Alaska and 
reported to Washington, D.C. In 1869 special Indian agent 
Vincent Colyer reported; in 1875 special Indian agent James Swan; 
in 1879 special treasury agent William Morris.10 In 1868, by the 
Alaska customs act of that year, Major General J.C. Davis, mili­
tary commander at Sitka, was designated to act in the capacity of 
Indian agent in Alaska .11 By the same act, President Johnson 
ordered that disposal of all liquors be governed by the military. 
In 1870 President Grant imposed a total prohibition of imported 
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liquors by executive order.12 
Direct executive services began in 1885 with the creation of 
the general agent for education. The Presbyterian missionary, 
Dr. Sheldon Jackson, had previously established twelve basic ele­
mentary grammar schools in nine Native villages.13 There was at 
the time a contract system being employed by the Indian Office 
( Interior Department) in western states and territories. The 
education office elected to employ the same mechanism in Alaska, 
contracting with missionary societies to supply teachers and 
materials. By 1895, schools had been established in twenty-seven 
separate villages.14 The U.S. Congress prohibited contracts with 
religious groups for federal Indian services. The education 
office curtailed its activities in Alaska from that date until 
additional funding was established by legislation in 1900, and 
again in 1905.15 From 1905 the Bureau of Education maintained an 
expanded organization of services until 1931, including first 
medical services through itinerant doctors and nurses and four 
Native hospitals, then boarding schools and orphanages and 
finally a marketing agent and warehouse in Seattle for the 
distribution of Alaska Native hand-crafted items.1 6 
From the beginning of its service, the education office con­
sidered teachers in Alaska village schools to exercise broad 
responsibility and powers, including the implementation of social 
policies for all village residents. 1 7 Such responsibilities were 
later codified. Additionally, Sheldon Jackson attempted to 
implement a system of reindeer herding among Natives in Arctic 
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Alaska in the 1890's to provide economic livelihood. 
In many ways Natives came to depend upon the counsel and 
service provided by education office personnel in Alaska, most 
particularly, medical services. The more developed organization 
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and its greater number of person­
nel and specializations brought to Alaska by the 1931 transfer, 
did nothing to decrease the level of dependence. 
Reorganization of federal Indian policy after the Meriam 
report of 1928, manifest in the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, had a significant impact on federal services for Alaska 
Natives. 18 In a sense, the reorganization of 1934 confirmed the 
increase in counsel and services attendant upon the transfer of 
ANS from the Bureau of Education to BIA in 1931. Additionally, 
because the application of certain provisions of the 1934 reorga­
nization act to Alaska was problematical, a series of amendments 
in 1936 clarified the right of village incorporation, the availa­
bility of credit funds and other IRA provisions. 19 
One important provision extended to Alaska Natives was expli-
cit recognition of their right to organize as villages. Native 
village communities had been the primary context of the provision 
of federal services from the beginning of Alaska ( 1 867). The 
Bureau of Education, for example, established its schools, hospi­
tals and later cooperative stores, in established villages. 20 
Congressional acts of 1884, 189 1 and 1899 confirmed withdrawal of 
land around or in the vicinity of established villages for the 
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purpose of providing these services, as did certain actions of 
the federal courts. 21 When, in 193 5, individual social security 
and other social service payments began to be made to Alaska 
Natives, they were regularly made through federal personnel 
( normally school teachers) in established village communities. 
The amendments of 193 6 stated explicitly that groups of Natives 
not recognized as tribes or boards, but having a common bond of 
occupation or association or residence within a well-defined 
neighborhood, community or rural district, might organize to 
adopt cons ti tut ions. 22 Following the amendments, one of BIA' s 
major activities, up to the outbreak of World War II, was the 
organization of traditional Native villages into formal, incor­
porated communities. 
Although BIA continued to provide certain services to Natives 
on an individual basis, most services and most interaction 
between federal agencies and Alaska Natives took place within the 
context of the village. For example, BIA organized an associa-
tion of villages, the Alaska Native Industries Cooperative 
Association, to purchase supplies in large quantities for distri­
bution to Native-run village cooperative stores. 23 Following the 
war, BIA continued the effort to organize villages for purposes 
of IRA council governance and to provide economic and other 
advice and counsel. Identification of Natives as groups in 
villages was manifest in the work of the Federal Field Committee 
for Development Planning in Alaska, which conducted extensive 
surveys in cooperation with BIA in the early 1960's and published 
its findings in 1968.24 The Field committee found that virtually 
all Alaska Natives were organized as villages and had been dealt 
with traditionally as villages. 
The granting of statehood to Alaska by the U.S. Congress had 
a profound effect on the relationshp between the federal govern­
ment and Alaska Natives. Effectively, statehood forced the 
federal government into a position of active advocacy of Alaska 
Native land claims and citizen rights, for statehood created an 
entity with significant contrary interest to those claims and 
rights, replacing an agency - the territory of Alaska - which had 
been considerably closer to Alaska Natives in commonality of 
interest.25 Most significant was the entitlement to the state 
by the statehood act of 103 million acres of land. The state 
began identification of preferred acreage immediately, in the 
process signaling its contrary interest, for numerous parcels of 
land identified by the state were lands to which Alaska Natives, 
upon advice and counsel of the BIA, either had claimed, or were 
developing claims.26 The position of the Territory of Alaska 
considering land claims was to refer the questions to the future, 
and to settlement by the Interior department, or perhaps the 
Congress.27 This, too, was the position of the State of Alaska. 
But, land selections by the state, because of their locations, 
implied that the state would not accept more than core township 
selections around Native villages, and would contest broader 
claims to traditional hunting and fishing areas on the grounds 
that such claims were inconsistent with the interest of the 
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statehood act. 28 Some state officials asserted that statehood 
selections should preempt Native claims on the same grounds. 
Prior to statehood, the Territory of Alaska had, in most 
instances, passed jurisdiction on Native questions to the BIA, 
thus confirming the role of BIA as primary executive agency for 
acquitting the federal obligation to Alaska Natives. In some 
instances, however ( for example, during war or in relation to 
shortages of critical materials), territorial officials often 
accepted responsibilities related to the federal obligation. 29 
The creation of the State of Alaska removed this concommi tant 
agency (Territory of Alaska) and replaced it with one which, 
whatever the attitude of its individual officials, did not have 
the same sense of obligation or complimentary interest. Through­
out the debate over and development of the settlement of Alaska 
Native claims the State of Alaska clarified its differing 
interpretation of, and often opposition to, Alaska Native 
interests. 
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 and the 
Indian Self-Determination Act of 1972 significantly altered the 
role of BIA as the primary agency of advice, counsel and advocacy 
for Alaska Natives. The leadership role of regional and village 
corporations has reduced the leadership function of BIA. So, 
too, has the decentralization of the rural school system in 
Alaska.JO BIA officials are no longer certain what role they are 
obligated to pursue as Native organizations take on increasing 
responsibility for Native affairs and activity. 
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Considerable historical research is needed to determine with 
precision and clarity the nature, origin and extent of federal 
activity in relation to Natives in Alaska, particularly executive 
federal activity. The policies and practices of the Bureau of 
Education are, as yet, only imperfectly known. The reasons for 
the transfer of ANS to BIA in 1931 need to be explored. Of espe­
cial interest is the organization of BIA field representatives 
after 1931, their responsibilities and activities, and their 
relationship with BIA school personnel, and with territorial and 
private mission personnel. The mechanism for the determination 
of eligibility for and the distribution of federal social service 
resources needs careful and detailed examination and 
explication.3 1 The background of BIA advocacy of Native land 
claims activity (its nature, extent and objectives) needs more 
clarification.3 2 The role of BIA in relation to the opposition 
of the State of Alaska to Native land claims needs to be 
understood clearly. Of particular importance is clarification of 
the role of BIA intended, or necessitated, by the continuation of 
federal services to Natives after the Alaska Native Land Claims 
Settlement Act of 1971, and particularly, after the transitory 
phase of that act, i.e., after 1991. 
The status of Alaska Natives following the claims settlement 
is somewhat ambiguous. It has been emphasized by several commen­
tators that the federal obligation is not jeopardized by the 
settlement, which extinguishes land claims. 3 3 Certainly ample 
precedent exists to suggest that federal obligation continues 
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through a period transition to greater Native individual manage-
ment of Native affairs. Further, detailed historical research is 
desirable in Interior opinions and the court record nationally to 
clarify the extent of federal obligation in circusmtances com­
parable to the development of greater Native responsibility 
flowing from the Alaska claims settlement, if any. In many ways 
the Alaska settlement is completely unique. The relationship 
between villages and regional corporations is virtually unprec-
dented. The reliance of villages, and individual villagers, upon 
federal representatives throughout the period of federal services 
in Alaska has created an expectation which cannot be quickly or 
lightly terminated. The hearings conducted by various committees 
of the Congress, together with Congressional debate, on the 
several land claims bills (prior to the passage of the final ver­
sion of the settlement in 1971), should be studied carefully to 
gauge the level and nature of federal obligation foreseen and 
anticipated. 
Legal Research and Historical Research 
In investigating the background of Alaska Native affairs, 
particularly to determine the extent of obligation by the federal 
government to provide services, and advice and counsel, it is 
important to realize that more than the legal history must be 
brought to bear on the question. This, indeed, has been the case 
in numerous important problems and questions in the history of 
attempting to determine - and enforce - justice in relations be­
tween the federal government and American Natives. It is possible 
for the Congress to pass a law, or for the courts to render a 
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decision, or for the executive agencies to terminate a particular 
policy in such a way as to legally bring an obligation to an end. 
But a majority of persons affected, or even observing, may feel 
such an action to be wrong or inadvisable. If there is only the 
legal background and precedent, altering such actions may take 
considerable time, and in fact, they may not be alterable at all. 
Those familiar with the history of Indian rights and claims 
in the United States will recognize the significance of the 
Tee-Hit-Ton decision in 1954-55 (128 Court of Claims 82), which 
held that Indians were not entitled to compensation for the 
taking of lands long in their possession. In this case the court 
held that since the title to the lands in question had not been 
recognized by the Congress and had never been recognized as being 
held by "Indian" or "aboriginal" title, that therefore compen-
sation was not warranted. Use and occupation were not enough. 
What the court seemed to be saying, through Justice Reed, was 
that although the American people had compassion for the Indians 
involved (Tlingit), there had to be an end to paying cash or 
other value for every Indian claim. 
Fortunately, the doctrine of Tee-Hit-Ton has been ignored by 
many courts in many cases, usually in instances when other than 
legal evidence can be brought to bear to show that compensation 
is just and desirable on historic, not legal, grounds. In the 
case of Otoe and Missouria in 1955 (131 Court of Claims 598), for 
example, the court found for compensation on the grounds that the 
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Indians had always depended on the land, were presently depending 
upon it for subsistence, but that such dependence was inadequate, 
and that the compensation would provide a way of meeting the 
pressing needs of the Indians in question. 
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 is another 
case in point. Many of the areas of Alaska in which the settle-
ment provides for Indian or Native ownership of land could be 
said to be subject to the Tee-Hit-Ton doctrine. Yet the compen­
sation was provided, albeit through Congressional legislation. 
What kind of evidence did the Congress review in coming to its 
decision? Certainly there were political pressures which Alaska 
Natives had to learn, and utilize. But there was also an abun-
dance of social and economic evidence of the right to and need 
for compensation, much of it provided by the Federal Field 
Commission for Development Planning in Alaska which published its 
findings in the report, Alaska Natives and the Land ( 1968). 
Additionally, there was an abundance of historical evidence, 
including length of habitation in various places, historic land 
use patterns, previous recognitions of occupancy by federal and 
resident reporters, as well as Natives' own testimony regarding 
use and need and right. 
Lawyers and others preparing legal briefs must concentrate on 
legal precedent, rules of evidence, and points of law. Perforce, 
this rules out much opportunity for historical research. The 
la,,vyer is trained in, and operates in, an environment of law and 
judicial decision. But ideology, social class and normative 
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values of political analysis may be just as, or even more impor­
tant than, the legal background of the question. Analysts of 
legal training in the United States have long criticized the 
narrow perspective resulting from the concentration on the "case 
method" which is the basis of law school curricula. More impor-
tant, concentration on cases reduces or eliminates a broader 
perspective based on historical research. The case method is 
necessary, for increasingly legal precedent figures significantly 
in the finding of law. Lawyers must be able to function effec­
tively in court. 
However, historical research can and must be brought to bear 
on the important questions regarding justice for Alaska Natives. 
In cases where it has been utilized it has proven effective. The 
Frank decision of several years ago not only provided for the 
taking of moose for a funeral potlatch, but as well forced a 
legislative revamping of the regulations applied by Fish and Game 
in all hunting, Native and non-Native. Significant historical 
evidence was brought to focus in the Frank case, and in a more 
recent case involving subsistence in the Copper River valley. 
Increasingly it seems, those preparing legal cases are recog-
nizing the value of historical research. 
Historical research is useful, then, not only in court, but 
in establishing the context in which legislation is necessary or 
desirable, in which executive action is advisable or damaging. 
The history of BIA activity in Alaska is as pertinent in 
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demonstrating the nature of the relationship between the federal 
government and Alaska Natives as is the legal background which 
authorized that activity. Whether intended or not, there was a 
history, and that history is independent of the judgment of pres­
ent legalists and others as to whether what happened should have, 
or was intended to. What the historian can show is what actually 
did happen, and therefore, what people now have come to expect. 
The law must deal not only with what is provided for in law, but 
also what people actually have done and have come to expect as a 
result of what they have done. 
However valuable the legal background may be (and it is very 
valuable) , a clear and complete understanding of the federal 
obligation to Alaska Natives can be determined only through a 
review of the historic patterns which have come to exist in the 
relationship between federal agencies and officials and Native 
Alaskans. Many aspects of that relationship are not provided for 
in law and are not covered in law. But they are nonetheless 
real. The complete texture of the federal relationship is the 
reality with which real people live, not just the legal portion 
of it. Continuing and expanded historical research can help show 
the whole relationship, and through an understanding of all its 
aspects, bring all parties closer to justice. 
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NOTES 
1 15 Stat. 539. See Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 
402 (1942). See also G.W. Spicer, The Constitutional Status and 
Government of Alaska (1927). 
2 The organization of the work of the Bureau of Education, 
for example, was conducted almost exclusively by the general 
agent, Sheldon Jackson, who was left to interpret such fundamen­
tal matters as compulsory school attendance without adequate
legislative guidance. See Henderson, The Development of 
Education in Alaska (1935). On the Pribilov Islands first the 
Treasury Department, and later the Bureau of Fisheries (U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service), were left to interpret and implement
Congressional mandate without sufficient guidelines. The history
of Alaska is replete with such examples. 
3 See, for example,Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. U.S., 248 US 
78 (1918). See also In re John Minook, 2 Alaska 2007T§°04) and 
U.S.� Berrigan, 2 Alaska 442 (D.C. AK, 1904). 
4 A perfect example of this is the implementation of the 
amendments to the Wheeler-Howard Act, which the director of the 
BIA office in Alaska was given responsibility to organize in 
1936. See c. 25f, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936). 
5 Not only the Bureau of Fisheries, but the U.S. Forest 
Service, the U.S. Commerce Department and even the National Park 
Service, among others, have from time to time developed policies
for Natives relevant to agency jurisdiction. 
6 During World War II, for example, Aleut islanders were 
evacuated to several points in southeast Alaska. At the end of 
the war, the army and the navy asked the BIA, through the 
Interior Department to oversee the resettlement of the islands. 
At the beginning of the war the Territory of Alaska asked the BIA 
to oversee the resettlement of the islanders in abandoned can­
neries in southeast Alaska, and although Aleuts were transported
by navy and army transports and their resettlement locations were 
inspected by Territory of Alaska personnel, BIA conducted medical 
inspections of the islanders, procured supplies for them, and 
supervised the camps during the resettlement period. 
7 See Henderson supra note 2. There were numerous reorgani­
zations. Eventually, ANS had three separate divisions: educa­
tion, medical services, and commercial enterprises. The latter 
was run from Seattle from 1924. 
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8 See Henderson, supra note 2, and Cook, Public Education in 
Alaska, (Bull No. 12, Office of Education, Dept. of Interior) 
(1927). 
9 The reasons for the selection of Education, rather than 
the Indian Office, are complex, but involve the personality and 
connections of Jackson as well as problems of ethnology. 
10 Colyer's report is the Annual Report of the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs for 1870. Swan's appeared in the Puget Sound 
Argus for September 7, 1877. Morris' was published as a Senate 
Special Report in 1880. 
11 See Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1869. 
12 45th Cong. 3rd s. Senate Document No. 59 (1872). 
l3 49th Cong. 1st S. Senate Exec. Doc. No. 85, Education in 
Alaska, 1886, Sheldon Jackson. 
14 Annual Report, Commissioner of Education, 1896. 
15 See Henderson, Supra note 2. 
16 Id. 
17 See Jackson, Education in Alaska, 1891. 52nd Cong., 1st 
s. , House Exec. Doc. No. l. 
18 48 Stat. 984. 
19 See Cohen, supra note l. 
20 See Report, supra note 14. 
21 See Spicer, supra note l. 
22 See Cohen, supra note l at 405. 
23 See Annual Report, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1932� 
see also Henderson, supra note 2. 
24 Alaska Natives and the Land (1968). 
25 See Hearings, Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, House,
1970. There are numerous examples of the Territory of Alaska 
soliciting information regarding Natives, and working with BIA to 
provide Native service. In addition to n. 6 above, see files in 
Record Group 75, BIA in the Federal Archives and Records Center,
Region X, Seattle, Washington. 
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26 See M.C. Berry, The Alaska Pipeline: The Politics of Oil 
and Native Land Claims (1975). 
27 See, for example, Annual Report, Governor of Alaska, 1952. 
28 Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962). 
29 Supra note 6. 
30 The State of Alaska has voluntarily entered into an out­
of-court settlement with plaintiffs in the "Molly Hootch" case. 
BIA is not sure what its role should be in terms of educational 
services and counsel, concluded L. Walker, ed. specialist, BIA 
area office, Juneau, Alaska. Personal interview, 31 July 1981. 
31 Records on this question are scattered between Washington, 
D.C. in the National Archives and the Federal Archives and 
Records Center, Region X, Seattle. 
32 A search should be made of testimony before various 
Congressional committees, as well as opinions of the area office 
director, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the opinions of 
the Interior Department solicitor. 
33 See D. Case, Special Relationship of Alaska Natives to 
the Federal Government (1978). 
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